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ABSTRACT
Shrestha, Bikash. M.S.E.E , Department of Electrical Engineering, Wright State University, 2017.
An Engage or Retreat Differential Game with Two Targets.
This thesis develops the equilibrium solution for a two-target engage or retreat differen-
tial game. In this game, the attacking player is modeled as a massless particle moving with
simple motion about an infinite, obstacle-free plane. The opposing player, referred to as
the defender, is tasked with the protection of two high-value targets. The mobile attacker
must choose to either engage one of the high-value targets or retreat across a predefined
boundary. Simultaneously, the defensive player must choose whether to minimize or max-
imize the attacker’s integral utility in an effort to persuade the attacker to choose retreat
from certain initial conditions. It is shown that the solution to the game can be constructed
in terms of two related optimization problems referred to as the Game of Engagement and
Optimal Constrained Retreat. The optimality conditions of the game are developed and
numerical solutions are presented for several illustrative examples.
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Introduction
There are many situations in which the protection of high-value assets from attack is
an important but challenging task. This task can be made all the more difficult when the
vulnerable assets are static and unable to withdraw from a threat. As an example, consider
the protection of important buildings such as embassies that could represent potential tar-
gets for terrorists or insurgences. Since these types of targets are unable to withdraw to
safer locations by their very nature, one must instead utilize defensive assets to neutralize
a potential threat if it appears or present such a credible threat that the potential attackers
choose to never engage the target to begin with. Through the strategic use of defensive
assets, the potential cost of engaging a target can offset any benefit or reward the attacker
receives from successfully engaging the target. When this occurs, retreat may become a
more attractive option for the attacker, and the defender achieves its goal of protecting the
high-value asset.
The defender’s manipulation of the attacker’s cost represents a form of indirect control
that the defender can leverage to manipulate the attacker’s behavior. In order to success-
fully protect the high-value targets, the defender must make the option of retreating more
attractive from the attacker’s perspective then engaging the target. Therefore, it may some-
times be beneficial for the defender to cooperate with the attacker by maximizing its utility
when it retreats. However, care must be taken to ensure the attacker does not move into
a region in which engagement becomes optimal. As a result, there may exist regions in
which the defender maximizes the attacker’s utility, but the attacker must follow a retreat
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trajectory around the target in order to avoid regions in which engagement becomes a more
attractive option.
Game theory provides an ideal environment to analyze the conflicting goals of the
attacker and defender and their interactions within the system. Differential Game theory
was first introduced by Rufus Issacs [7] and has since been applied to a wide range of
attacker-defender scenarios. An active target defense scenario was examined in [2, 3], in
which a defensive team consisting of a mobile high-value target and mobile protective
agent maneuvered such that the defensive agent intercepted a mobile target as far from
the high-value target as possible. In [6] , a two-team differential game was presented in
which one team consists of a single mobile attacker, and the defending team is composed
of a mobile high-value target and mobile defensive agent. The attacker strives to get as
close to the high-value target as possible before being intercepted by the mobile defensive
agent. These previous games always assume the attacker must engage the targets and the
defenders must minimize the attacker’s utility.
In this thesis, we present a two-player, differential game where one player represents
an attacker which chooses to terminate the game either by engaging one of two high value
targets or crossing a defined retreat boundary. The opposing player represents a defender
tasked with defending two static, high-value targets. The defender does not posses direct
control on the dynamics of the system, but instead manipulates the utility function in an ef-
fort to persuade the attacker to choose retreat over engagement. This particular problem is a
an extension of a previous game presented in [5], in which only one target was considered.
The game is solved using the general solution technique developed in [4] . Using this tech-
nique, the solution for the game is obtained by solving two related optimization problems
called Game of Engagement (GoE) and Optimal Constrained Retreat (OCR). In the GoE,
it is assumed that the attacker strives to engage any of the static high value targets while
the defender aims to minimize the attacker’s utility function. In the OCR, it is assumed
that the attacker intends to retreat while the static defensive team responds to cooperate
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the attacker’s intention by maximizing its utility function. An inequality constrained is
imposed to restrict the attacker from moving into regions in which engagement becomes
optimal. This creates some constrained retreat trajectories which we will refer to as escort
trajectories. It was shown in [4] that for a given initial state, the equilibrium solution to the
Engage or Retreat game is provided by the solution of either the GoE or OCR.
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the overall
Engage or Retreat Game under consideration. The optimality conditions for the equilibrium
solutions are developed in Section 3. In order to solve the game, we develop the optimality
conditions for the Game of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat in Section 3.1
and Section 3.2 respectively. The overall solution of the game is developed in Section
3.3. Several numerical examples are presented in Section 4, and concluding remarks are
provided in Section 5.
3
Game Description
This work investigates a two player, engage or retreat differential game, in which one
player represents a mobile attacker and the opposing player represents a defender protecting
two static, high-value targets. The attacker is modeled as a massless particle that chooses to
terminate the game either by capturing any one of the two high-value targets or retreating
to a defined retreat surface. The defender’s sole goal here, is to protect the high-value
targets, and the defender attempts to persuade the attacker into retreat by manipulating the
integral cost within the attacker’s utility function. This chapter describes the game under
consideration. In Section 2.1, the system dynamics are described using two equivalent
coordinate systems. The player utility functions are described in Section 2.2, and the game
is formally defined in Section 2.3 .
2.1 System Description
To analyze this game, two different, but equivalent, coordinate systems are used. The
first coordinate system is referred to as the global coordinate system. Using this coor-
dinate system, the position of the attacker is defined by a pair of Cartesian coordinates:
x̂ := (xA, yA). The position of the high-value Target 1 and Target 2 are defined by their
respective pair of Cartesian coordinates: x1 := (x1, y1) and x2 = (x2, y2). Since the tar-
gets are static, their positions are not considered to be components of the state, but simply
parameters of one instantiation of the game. The heading of the attacker is defined by the
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angle ψ̂, which is measured counter-clockwise from the x-axis and represents the Attacker’s
control variable ûA := ψ̂. The Defender’s control ûD := θ does not influence the state of
the system, but manipulates the integral cost of the Attacker, which will be discussed in de-
tail in Section 2.2 . The global coordinate system is graphically depicted in Figure 2.1. The
system dynamics, ẋ = f(x, ûA, ûD), are described by a system of two ordinary differential
equations:
ẋA = vp cos(ψ̂) (2.1)
ẏA = vp sin(ψ̂), (2.2)
where vp represents the Attacker’s constant speed.
In order to simplify later analysis of the optimality conditions, a relative coordinate
system is also used. For the relative coordinates, the state of the system is defined as
x := (d, α). The state component d represents the distance between the Attacker and
the nearest high-value target, and angle α represents the angle measured counterclockwise
from between the vector
←−
ATi and the x-axis. The Attacker’s relative heading, ψ, is mea-
sured counterclockwise from
←−
ATi: uA = ψ, and the Defender’s control remains unchanged:
uD = θ. The relative coordinate system is visually depicted in Figure 2.2 .
The global and relative coordinates are related through the following equations
xA = d cos(α) + xi (2.3)
yA = d sin(α) + yi (2.4)
ψ̂ = ψ + α (2.5)
where
i = argmin
i
√
(xA − xi)2 + (yA − yi)2. (2.6)
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Using the coordinate relationships (2.3)-(2.5) and the global system dynamics (2.1)-(2.2),
we can compute system dynamics using the relative coordinate system:
ḋ = υp cos(ψ) (2.7)
α̇ =
1
di
υp sin(ψ). (2.8)
Figure 2.1: Global Coordinates Figure 2.2: Relative Coordinates
The Attacker may choose to terminate the game by either capturing one of the high-
value targets or retreating across a defined retreat boundary. The terminal time, tf , is
defined as the moment, the state of the system satisfies either the engagement condition,
ΓE(x) =
√
(xA − xi)2 + (yA − yi)2 − dc = 0 (2.9)
or the retreat condition,
ΓR(x) = yA − yr = 0 (2.10)
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We define the engagement surface XE and retreat surface XR, as the collection of state
values that satisfy their respective termination conditions:
XR =
{
x ∈ R2 | Γ(xR) = 0
}
XE =
{
x ∈ R2 | Γ(xE) = 0
}
.
2.2 Player Utilities
The Attacker’s utility, UA(uA(t), uD(t);x0), consists of a terminal value function and
an integral cost function incurred throughout the game. The Defender’s utility depends
solely on the terminal condition of the game, UD(uA(t), uD(t);x0). The two utility func-
tions are defined as
UA(uA(t), uD(t);x0) := φA(xf )−
∫ tf
t0
C(uD(t))dt (2.11)
UD(uA(t), uD(t);x0) := φD(xf ) (2.12)
where C(uD(t)) = c1uD + c2 is the instantaneous cost function integrated throughout the
game period. The constant c1 represents the maximum damage that may be inflicted by
the Defender and the constant c2 represents a time or energy penalty. The terminal value
functions φA(xf ) and φD(xf ) determine the Attacker and Defender’s respective reward or
penalty dependent on how the game ends. The terminal value functions are defined as
φA(xf ) =
 a1 xf ∈ XE0 xf ∈ XR (2.13)
φD(xf ) =
 −b1 xf ∈ XE0 xf ∈ XR , (2.14)
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where the constant a1 > 0 represents the Attacker’s reward for terminating the game in
engagement, and the constant b1 > 0 represents the Defender’s penalty. For this game,
there is no penalty for either the Attacker and Defender for terminating the game in retreat.
2.3 Game Definition
Using the player utility functions, (2.11 ) - (2.12), we can define a differential game in
which each player attempts to maximize their respective utilities:
U∗A(uD(t);x0) = max
uA(t)
UA(uA(t), uD(t);x0) (2.15)
U∗D(uA(t);x0) = max
uD(t)
UD(uA(t), uD(t);x0) (2.16)
The Nash Equilibrium solution to this game is the pair of equilibrium open-loop strate-
gies, u∗A(t;x0) and u
∗
B(t;x0), and resulting equilibrium utility values, U
∗
A(x0) and U
∗
B(x0),
that satisfy the following Nash Equilibrium conditions
UA(u
∗
A(t), u
∗
D(t);x0) = U
∗
A(x0) ≥ UA(uA(t), u∗D(t);x0) (2.17)
UD(u
∗
A(t), u
∗
D(t);x0) = U
∗
D(x0) ≥ UD(u∗A(t), uD(t);x0) (2.18)
In Chapter 3, we develop the optimality conditions used to determine if this condition can
be met and what the resulting equilibrium strategies are for each of the players.
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Game Solution
The overall solution to the Engage or Retreat game will be constructed from the so-
lutions of two related optimization problems. We will pose and solve the Game of En-
gagement in Section 3.1. Using the resulting value function, we will pose an Optimal
Constrained Retreat problem in Section 3.2. Using the solutions of these problems, we will
pose the overall solution of the Engage or Retreat game in Section 3.3
3.1 Game of Engagement
In the Game of Engagement, it is assumed that the Attacker chooses to terminate the
game on the engagement surface, XE . It is also assumed the Defender attempts to minimize
the Attacker’s utility over the course of the game.
3.1.1 Game Definition
Using the system dynamics (2.1)-(2.2) and the Attacker’s utility (2.11) we can pose a
zero-sum differential game:
VE(x0) = min
uD(t)
max
uA(t)
UA(uA(t), uD(t);x0), (3.1)
with the constraint ΓE(xf ) = 0.
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The function VE(x0)represents the equilibrium value of the game starting at x0 when
the Attacker and Defender implement their respective equilibrium open-loop strategies
uE∗A (t,x0), u
E∗
D (t,x0), where
uE∗A (t;x0), u
E∗
D (t;x0) = arg min
uD(t)
max
uA(t)
UA(uA(t), uD(t);x0). (3.2)
This formulation represents a standard zero-sum, pursuit evasion differential game,
which can be solved using standard techniques [1].
3.1.2 Optimality Condition
We begin developing the optimality conditions for the game of engagement by con-
structing the Hamiltonian. As we have previously set the terminal reward (2.13 ) for ending
the game in engagement as constant, the Hamiltonian is known to be zero along the optimal
trajectories:
HE = λ
T
Ef(x, uA, uD)− C(x, uA, uD)
= λxEvp cosψ̂ + λyEvp sinψ̂ − (c1uD + c2) = 0. (3.3)
The vector λE consists of the adjoint variables conjugate to the kinematic equations
and also represents the gradient of the value function:
λE = (λxE , λyE)
T
=
(
∂VE
∂x
,
∂VE
∂y
)T
. (3.4)
The optimal control strategies for each of the players are found by maximizing and
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minimizing the Hamiltonian (3.3) accordingly:
cos(ψ̂E∗) =
λxE√
λ2xE + λ
2
yi
(3.5)
sin(ψ̂E∗) =
λyE√
λ2xE + λ
2
yE
(3.6)
vE∗p = v̄p θ
E∗ = c1 (3.7)
In order for us to solve the game of engagement, we need to know the trajectories of
the attacker along the engagement path and for this we need to know the values of adjoint
variables. These adjoint variable components can be found by taking the partial derivatives
of the Hamiltonian (3.3) with respect to each of the state components, and is given as:
λ̇x = −
∂H
∂x
= 0 λ̇y = −
∂H
∂y
= 0 (3.8)
We see that the time derivative is zero for both λx and λy, which implies that the adjoint
variables are constant over the course of the game.
Using the capture condition (2.9) and the terminal reward function (2.13), an adjoined
terminal value function is constructed:
ΦE(xf ) = α1 + νE
(√
(xA − xTi)2tf + (yA − yTi)
2
tf
− dc
)
, (3.9)
where the term νE is a Lagrange multiplier. The partial derivative of this terminal function
will provide us with the terminal adjoint variables:
λx(tf ) =
∂ΦE
∂xf
= νE
(xAf − xTf )√
(xAf − xTf )2 + (yAf − yTf )2
(3.10)
λy(tf ) =
∂ΦE
∂yf
= νE
(yAf − yTf )√
(xAf − xTf )2 + (yAf − yTf )2
. (3.11)
11
Since the terminal attacker reward (2.13) is constant, the Hamiltonian will always
equal zero. Hence, now we can solve for the value of νE with the help of optimal control
(3.5)-(3.6) and evaluating it at terminal time t = tf .
λx(tf )vp cos(ψ
E∗) + λy(tf )vp sin(ψ
E∗))− (c1 + c2) = 0
λx(tf )vp
λx(tf )√
λx(tf )2 + λy(tf )2
+ λy(tf )vp
λy(tf )√
λx(tf )2 + λy(tf )2
= (c1 + c2)
vp
λ2x(tf ) + λ
2
y(tf )√
λx(tf )2 + λy(tf )2
= (c1 + c2)
vp
√
λ2x(tf ) + λ
2
y(tf )
2 = (c1 + c2)
υp|νE| = (c1 + c2)
⇒ νE = +
−
(c1 + c2)
vp
Looking at the Attacker’s equilibrium control strategy (3.5)-(3.6) , we see that a pos-
itive value for νE would imply an Attacker control, which is pointing away from the high-
value target, and a negative value for νE implies a terminal control pointing towards the
high-value target. Therefore, only the negative value provides a feasible solution:
νE = −
(c1 + c2)
υp
. (3.12)
Substituting the solution into the terminal adjoint variable expressions (3.10)-(3.11)
provides
λxi(tf ) = −
(xA − xTi)(c1 + c2)
υp dc
(3.13)
λyi(tf ) = −
(yA − yTi)(c1 + c2)
υp dc
(3.14)
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3.1.3 Equilibrium Solution
By combining the control strategies, system dynamics and adjoint equations we can
calculate the complete solution for the Game of Engagement for a given initial condition.
The solution is stated in Theorem 1 given below
Theorem 1. Assume an initial state x0 for the Game of Engagement. The equilibrium
control strategies are given as:
cos(ψE∗;x0) = −
xA − xTi√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
(3.15)
sin(ψE∗;x0) = −
yA − yTi√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
, (3.16)
where i = arg mini
√
(xA0 − xT i)2 + (yA0 − yT i)2. The resulting state trajectories, termi-
nal time, and value function when the equilibrium control is implemented are:
xE∗A (t;x0) = xA0 + vp cos(ψ
E∗)t (3.17)
yE∗A (t;x0) = yA0 + vp sin(ψ
E∗)t (3.18)
tE∗f (x0) =
(√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yT1i)2 − dc
)
vp
(3.19)
VE(x0) = α1 −
(c1 + c2)
vp
(√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 − dc
)
. (3.20)
Proof. From the equation (3.8) we observe that the change in the adjoint variables is always
zero, which implies that the adjoint variables from equations (3.13) and (3.14) are constant
over the course of the game. Combining this with attacker’s optimal control (3.5) and (3.6)
we see that the equilibrium control is also constant over the course of the game. Integrating
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forward in time, we can express the Attacker’s state trajectory in terms of the equilibrium
control:
xE∗(t;x0) = xA0 + vp cos(ψ
E∗)t (3.21)
yE∗(t;x0) = yA0 + vp sin(ψ
E∗)t (3.22)
Evaluating the equilibrium trajectories (3.21)-(3.22) at terminal time and combining with
the terminal engagement condition (2.9) assuming that Target j was captured and equilib-
rium control strategy (3.15)-(3.16) provides a system of four nonlinear algebraic equations
with three unknowns (t∗f , ψ
∗, xAf , yAf ). Solving these equations provides the equilibrium
control in terms of the initial condition (3.15)-(3.16) and the terminal time t∗f . We can then
use the terminal time to calculate the equilibrium utility.
This solution provides the equilibrium solution assuming target i was captured. How-
ever, a unique solution can be generated for both i = 1 and i = 2. Since the attacker is
capable of capturing either target of its choice, it should choose the target that provides the
maximum utility. This is equivalent to capturing the target with minimum distance from
the Attacker’s initial condition.
There exists a subset of the admissible state space in which engaging either target
yields the same utility for Player A. This subset forms a type of singular surface known
as a dispersal surface. On this surface, choosing to terminate the game in engagement of
either Target 1 or Target 2 provides an equally optimal solution. The surface is formally
defined in Theorem 2.
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Theorem 2. The surface
SD :=
{
x ∈ RA |
√
(xA − x1)2 + (yA − y1)2 =
√
(xA − x2)2 + (yA − y2)2
}
(3.23)
represents a dispersal surface with respect to the Attacker’s control within the Game of
Engagement.
Proof. Assume that x0 ∈ SD. We begin by analyzing the value function (3.20) for engag-
ing either target:
VE1(x0) = α1 −
(c1 + c2)
vp
(√
(xA − xT1)2 + (yA − yT1)2 − dc
)
(3.24)
VE2(x0) = α1 −
(c1 + c2)
vp
(√
(xA − xT2)2 + (yA − yT2)2 − dc
)
(3.25)
Substituting definition of SD into VE1 we see that engaging either target provides equal
utility:
VE1(x0) = α1 −
(c1 + c2)
vp
(√
(xA − xT1)2 + (yA − yT1)2 − dc
)
(3.26)
= α1 −
(c1 + c2)
vp
(√
(xA − xT2)2 + (yA − yT2)2 − dc
)
(3.27)
= VE2(x0) (3.28)
Therefore, both solutions are in equilibrium and the surface SD represents a dispersal sur-
face.
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3.2 Optimal Constrained Retreat
Using the solution for the Game of Engagement presented in Theorem 1 , we can
now pose the Optimal Constrained Retreat problem. Here, the attacker strives to reach the
retreat zone by maximizing its utility function. At the same time, the key role of Defender
is to cooperate and also maximize the Attacker’s utility in an effort to make retreat as
attractive as possible. Using the same dynamics and Player A utility function, we can pose
the optimal constrained retreat problem as
VR(x0) = max
uA(t)
max
uD(t)
UA(uA(t), uD(t),xA) (3.29)
with the terminal constraint ΓR(xf ) = 0, which represents the termination condition in
retreat.
Here, the defending player will be trying to maximize the utility function of mobile
attacking player. So, there might be possibility that the attacker might try to switch to
engagement if the engagement utility (3.20) exceeds the value of retreat. In order to avoid
such situation from occurring, the high value target impose a restriction in the attacker’s
utility function so that it would be bound to choose retreat over engagement:
VR(x(t))− VE(X(t)) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [t0, tf ] (3.30)
We can now convert this value function into a state inequality constraint by adding an
additional state variable, c(t) with a time derivative given as:
ċ = C(uD(t)) (3.31)
This state variable represents the remaining integral cost for the rest of the game,and it has
the terminal constraint c(tf ) = 0. This means the game would terminate as soon as the
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attacker reaches the retreat surface so the cost at that particular terminal time will be zero.
The value function for retreat consists of the terminal value function and the integral
cost for terminating the game in retreat:
VR(x) = φA(x(tf ))−
∫ tf
0
C (x(t), uA(t), uD) (t)dt
= φA(x(tf ))−
*0c(tf ) + c(t0)
= φA(x(tf )) + c(t0) (3.32)
From Equations (3.30) and (3.32), we can restate the value function constraint as a state
variable constraint,
g(x) = φA(x(tf )) + c(t0)− VE(x(tf )) ≥ 0 (3.33)
We now need to determine the effect of this constraint on optimal controls of the
Attacker and the Defender. However, g(x) is not an explicit function of control. Thus, g(x)
is successively differentiated with respect to time until its dependency on control variables
(uA or uD) shows up.
h(x) =
∂g(x)
∂t
=
∂(φA(x(tf )) + c(t0)− VE(x(tf )))
∂t
= (uDc1 + c2) +
(c1 + c2) [(xA − xTi) cos(ψ) + (yA − yTi) sin(ψ)]√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
(3.34)
where i = arg mini
√
(xA − xi)2 + (yA − yi)2.
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3.2.1 Optimality Condition
Just like the game of engagement, we start calculating the solution for the Optimal
Constrained Retreat (OCR) by constructing the Hamiltonian. Also for this game, the ter-
minal reward for completing the game is constant i.e zero. So, the Hamiltonian is known to
be zero along its optimal trajectories. The Hamiltonian of the OCR consists of the system
dynamics, utility function of attacker and the control equality constraints and additional
state value:
HR = λ
T
xR
f(x, uA, uB)− C(x, uA, uB) + µh(x)
= λxRvp cos(ψ) + λyRvp sin(ψ) + λc(uDc1 + c2)
− (uDc1 + c2) + µ [uDc1 + c2 + κ] (3.35)
where,
κ =
(c1 + c2)(xA − xT i) cos(ψ) + (yA − yT i) sin(ψ)√
(xA − xT i)2 + (yA − yT i)2
The additional adjoint variable µ is a scalar and satisfies
µ(t) = 0 when g(x) > 0
µ(t) ≤ 0 when g(x) = 0 (3.36)
The Hamiltonian can be rearranged to factor out the Attacker’s control
HR = cos(ψ)%1 + sin(ψ)%2 + (uDc1 + c2)(λc + µ− 1) (3.37)
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where,
%1 = λxRvp + µ
(c1 + c2)(xA − xT i)√
(xA − xT i)2 + (yA − yT i)2
%2 = λyRvp + µ
(c1 + c2)(yA − yT i)√
(xA − xT i)2 + (yA − yT i)2
The equilibrium control for the Attacker is found by maximizing the Hamiltonian:
cos(ψR∗) =
%1√
%21 + %
2
2
, sin(ψR∗) =
%2√
%21 + %
2
2
(3.38)
The optimal value for uR∗D ranges from 0 to 1 and is determined by the value (λc+µ−
1).
uR∗D =

0, (λc + µ− 1) ≤ 0
1, (λc + µ− 1) > 0
(3.39)
The adjoint variables gives the data on, how the attacker is approaching any of the
high value targets. And these are obtained through the partial derivative of Hamiltonian
(3.37 ) with respect to each of the state variables used i.e.
λ̇xR = −
∂HR
∂x
= −µ(c1 + c2)
$1
%
,
λ̇yR = −
∂HR
∂y
= −µ(c1 + c2)
$2
%
λ̇c = −
∂HR
∂c
= 0 (3.40)
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where,
$1 =
[
(yA − yTi)2cos(ψ)− (yA − yTi)(xA − xT i)sin(ψ)√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
]
$2 =
[
(xA − xTi)2sin(ψ)− (yA − yTi)(xA − xT i)cos(ψ)√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
]
% =
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
In order to calculate the terminal values of the adjoint variables we need to construct
a terminal value function like the one below:
ΦR(xf ) = φA(xf ) + νR(y − yR) (3.41)
Here, ΦR(xf ) is the terminal retreat value function and ψA(xf ) is the terminal penalty to
attacker for considering the retreat which in this case is zero as given in equation (2.14) .
Now, the terminal adjoint values are determined by taking the partial derivative of terminal
value function (3.41):
λxR(tf ) =
∂ΦR(xf )
∂x
= 0 (3.42)
λyR(tf ) =
∂ΦR(xf )
∂y
= νR (3.43)
λc(tf ) =
∂ΦR(xf )
∂c
= 0 (3.44)
Substituting the above terminal adjoint variables in the Hamiltonian (3.35) and eval-
uating at terminal time, we will be able to get the value of Lagrange multiplier νR. Now,
solving the unconstrained Hamiltonian equation (3.35) at t = tf and equating it with our
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terminal adjoint variables (3.42)-(3.44) we get,
>
0
HR =7
0
λxR(tf ) ῡpcos(ψ) +7
νR
λyR(tf ) ῡpsin(ψ) +
(
7
0
λc(tf )− 1)
)
c2
On solving it:
|νR|=
c2
υp
(3.45)
Though the theoretical value of νR can be both positive or negative, we take a negative
value in practice,since we are assuming the attacker is moving from retreat region to its
original position. Hence,
νR = −
c2
vp
(3.46)
Our terminal adjoint variables will be
λxR(tf ) =
∂ΦR(xf )
∂x
= 0 (3.47)
λyR(tf ) =
∂ΦR(xf )
∂y
= − c2
υp
(3.48)
λc(tf ) =
∂ΦR(xf )
∂c
= 0 (3.49)
The addition of the state constraint (3.31 ) , introduces internal jump conditions on the
adjoint variables that occur as the state enters or exits the constraint. These jump conditions
satisfy
λT (tj+) = λ
T (tj−) + π1
δg
δx(tj)
+ π2
δh
δx(tj)
, (3.50)
where tj is the time that the trajectory activates the state constraint.
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3.2.2 Optimal Solution
The state constraint and the resulting jump conditions create a piecewise equilibrium
solution, which consists of multiple constrained and unconstrained segments. In order to
generate a complete trajectory we must develop these trajectory segments piece by piece
working backwards from the terminal surface.
We begin solving an unconstrained arc backward from the terminal surface. Since the
constraint is not active µ = 0 and our Hamiltonian will be:
H = λxRvp cos(ψ) + λyRvp sin(ψ) + λc(>
0
uDc1 + c2) = 0 (3.51)
Also since we are dealing with the retreat region, the value of uD will be zero since
the high value targets are maximizing the attacker’s utility function i.e uD = 0 giving us
the equation:
H = λxRvp cos(ψ) + λyRvp sin(ψ) + λcc2 = 0
The optimal control is obtained as:
cos(ψR∗) =
λxR√
λ2xR + λ
2
yR
, sin(ψR∗) =
λyR√
λ2xR + λ
2
yR
(3.52)
The optimal controls at the terminal time is given as:
cosψR∗(tf ) =
λxR(tf )√
λ2xR(tf ) + λ
2
yR(tf )
sinψR∗(tf ) =
λyR(tf )√
λ2xR(tf ) + λ
2
yR(tf )
We know the terminal values of our adjoint variables form equations (3.47) ,(3.48)
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and (3.49) as:
λxR(tf ) = 0, λyR(tf ) = −
c2
υA
, λc(tf ) = 0 (3.53)
Now, using the information from equation (3.52)and (3.53),the optimal control for
unconstrained region will become:
cos(ψR∗)(tf ) = 0 sin(ψ
R∗)(tf ) = −1 (3.54)
This will also change the kinematic equations for unconstrained region of xA and yA
as:
ẋA = υp 7
0
cos(ψR∗)(tf ) = 0 (3.55)
ẏA = υp 
−1
sin(ψR∗)(tf ) = −υA (3.56)
Integrating the dynamics provide the optimal trajectory segment
x(t) = xf (3.57)
y(t) = yf − vAt+ yc, (3.58)
where yc is unknown constant of integration. Along this unconstrained segment, the value
of the optimal constrained retreat is given as:
VR(x) = −
c2
υA
(yA − yr). (3.59)
In order to develop the next optimal segment we must calculate the tangency point,
xT in which the trajectory leaves the constrained arc. This point must satisfy the above
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retreat boundary as well as the state constraint (3.30), and the control constraint (3.38 ).
Substituting the unconstrained retreat value and Game of Engagement value function into
the state constraint provides
g(x) = VR(x)− VE(x) = 0
= − c2
vp
(yA − yr)− a1 +
c1 + c2
vA
(κ− dc)
= c2(yA − yr)− a1υp + (c1 + c2)(κ− dc) = 0 (3.60)
The control equality constraint which was obtained by differentiating state inequality con-
straint with respect to time is:
h(x) = g
′
(x) = V̇R(x)− V̇E(x)
= − c2
υp
ẏA +
c1 + c2
υp
[
ẋA(xA − xTi) + ẏA(yA − yTi)√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
]
(3.61)
From equations (3.55) and (3.56) , equation (3.61) will change to:
h(x) = − c2
υp
∗ (−υp) +
c1 + c2
υA
(
−υp(yA − yTi)√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
)
= c2 −
(c1 + c2)(yA − yTi)√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
= 0
=
(c1 + c2)(yA − yTi)√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
= c2
⇒
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 =
(yA − yTi)(c1 + c2)
c2
(3.62)
Now, implementing equation (3.62) into (3.60):
−c2(yA − yr)− ξ +
(c1 + c2)
2(yA − yTi)
c2
= 0
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where,
κ =
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2
ξ = a1vp + (c1 + c2)κ
Then,
(c1 + c2)
2
c2
yA −
c(c1 + c2)
2
c2
yTi − c2yA + c2yr − ξ = 0
yA
[
(c1 + c2)
2 − c22
c2
]
=
(c1 + c2)
2
c2
yTi + ξ − c2yr
yA =
c2
[
(c1+c2)2
c2
yTi + ξ − c2yr
]
(c1 + c2)2 − c22
The y component of the tangency point then satisfies:
yT =
(c1 + c2)
2yTi + c2a1υp + c2(c1 + c2)dc − c22dcyr
(c1 + c2)2 − c22
(3.63)
Using the information of equation (3.63) and implementing it in equation (3.62), we
can compute the x component of the tangency point:
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 =
(yA − yTi)(c1 + c2)
c2
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 =
(yA − yTi)2(c1 + c2)2
c22
(yA − yTi)2
[
(c1 + c2)
2
c22
− 1
]
= (xA − xTi)2
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xT = (yA − yTi)
√
(c1 + c2)2 − c22
c2
+ xTi (3.64)
Along the contrained trajectory the adjoint variable corresponding to the state con-
straint µ is nonzero, which ensures the equilibrium Attacker control does not violate the
derivative constraint h(x) = 0. We can solve for the constrained value of µ in terms of the
state and adjoint variables by substituting the optimal control strategies into the derivative
constraint:
h(x) = V̇R(x)− V̇E(x) (3.65)
= c2 −
1
c1 + c2
[
x− xTi√
(x− xTi)2 + (y − yTi)2
cos(ψ) +
y − yTi√
(x− xTi)2 + (y − yTi)2
sin(ψ)
]
= 0
(3.66)
Solving for the control provides:
tan(ψ) = tan
(
α + cos−1
(
c1
c1+c2
))
, (3.67)
where tanα = (y − yTi)/(x − xTi). Substituting the equilibrium control strategies for ψ
yields
λxRvp
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 + µ(c1 + c2)(xA − xTi)
λyRvp
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 + µ(c1 + c2)(yA − yTi)
= tan
[
α + cos−1
(
c1
c1 + c2
)]
(3.68)
We can now solve directly for µ along the constrained trajectory.
Additionally, the constrained optimal attacker control ψ is provided by (3.67). Using
the constrained control, adjoint equations, dynamic, and optimal µ, we can integrated back-
wards until the state enters the constrained arc at time t1. This process is repeated along
each constrained and unconstrained segment of the optimal trajectory in order to construct
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the complete optimal solution for the given initial condition x0. Due to the nonlinear and
coupled nature of the state and adjoint equations, it is difficult to analytically calculate the
constrained trajectories. As a result, these segments are numerically integrated.
3.3 Engage or Retreat Solution
Using the solutions of the Game of Engagement and the Optimal Constrained retreat,
we can develop the overall solution to the Engage or Retreat Game [4] . It is possible
that a solution may not exist to the OCR for some values of x0. Therefore, we can divide
the admissible state space into two regions: a region that contains states that possess a
solution to the OCR and a region whose states do not posses a solution to the OCR. They
are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1.
RR := {x ∈ RA|∃uR∗A (t;x), uR∗D (t;x)} (3.69)
RE := RA \RR (3.70)
The overall solution to the ERG can be found for a particular x0 by identifying which
region the initial state belongs to and then implementing the control strategies defined in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose that regions RE and RR exist as defined by Definition 1. Additionally,
suppose that VE(x) ≤ VR(x) along the boundary of RR. The following control strategies
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constitute a Nash Equilibrium for the Engage or Retreat Game defined in (3.69) and (3.70).
u∗A(t;x0) =

uR∗A (t;x0) x0 ∈ RR
uE∗A (t;x0) x0 ∈ RE
(3.71)
u∗D(t;x0) =

uR∗D (t;x0) x0 ∈ RR
uE∗D (t;x0) x0 ∈ RE
(3.72)
The resulting Nash Equilibrium utilities for each player are
U∗A(x0) =

VR(x0) x0 ∈ RR
VE(x0) x0 ∈ RE
(3.73)
and
U∗D(x0) =

−b1 x0 ∈ RR
0 x0 ∈ RE
. (3.74)
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Numerical Examples
As we have discussed, each of the optimization problems, Game of Engagement
and Optimal Constrained Retreat, represents one individual game.Thus, the results are
expressed in terms of numerical solutions for each of the game separately and also as a
complete solution.
4.1 Game of Engagement
In this following section, we have examined the equilibrium trajectories and the value
function of the game using the given parameters.
ῡp = 1, a1 = 1, c1 = 1, c2 = 1, dc = 1, yR = −7
Plots
To get the plots for Game of Engagement, a series of procedure has been taken. First of
all, we choose a single high value target and a single attacker position, then the trajectories
were drawn accordingly showing how the attacker approaches the high value target. After
having one successful capture, we then considered two high value targets. The dispersal
surface represents the state in the game when the attacker gains equal value function for
engaging both the high value targets from different initial position .
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We have designed the game in such a way that, whenever the attacker is at any posi-
tion, based on the value function and the distance, it will approach the target nearer to it.
The dispersal line separates each of the high value target in a minimal distance or the one
which it can have maximum value function with. For this thesis work, we have considered
a single attacker and two high value targets, but eventually,this can be used for any number
of high value targets.The only thing is there will be complication in trajectories and disper-
sal surface.
Here, Figure 4.1 represents the analytical solution for two high value targets and a
single attacker.Here, in this figure, the blue and the red lines represents the engagement
trajectories for either of the high value targets.Whenever the attacker reaches the capture
distance of any of the high value target the game will terminate.For the sake of illustration,
we have shown the trajectories for both of the high value targets. Figure 4.2 shows the
trajectories of our adjoint variables for the above multi-player game.It suggest how the
deviation of trajectories will let the attacker to get into the capture zone of either high value
target.
Figure 4.3 gives the visualization for the engagement to one particular high value
target given several initial position of attacker. If the attacker is position like the way in
the figure, then it should definitely engage target 1 . The black dotted line represents the
dispersal surface. Similarly, Figure 4.4 represents the engagement trajectories for targets 2
for various initial position of attacker. Figure 4.5 shows the general engagement approach
by the attacker to either of the targets.Since,there is no change in the derivative term of
adjoint variables, the plots for the adjoint variables shows the trajectory with some constant
value. Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 represents the plot for the value function of engagement
to high value target 1 and 2 respectively. Since, we are evaluating this as a single game, we
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Figure 4.1: Analytical Solution
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Figure 4.2: Adjoint Trajectories.
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Figure 4.3: Approaching Target 1
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
x
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
y
Figure 4.4: Approaching Target 2
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Figure 4.5: Engage Trajectories Figure 4.6: Value Plot for Engaging Target 1
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Figure 4.7: Value Plot for Engaging Target 2
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Figure 4.8: Combined Value Funtion
need to get one value function for our game of engagement.Here, we have said the attacker
is trying to maximize its utility function, so, we need to get the maximum value between
these two value functions.i.e
VE(x0) = arg max (VE1(x0), VE2(x0))
Figure 4.8 represents the combined maximum value function for engaging either of
the high value target given any initial position of attacker.
4.2 Optimal Constrained Retreat
The game can be divided into numerous conditions depending upon the orientation of
the high value targets.For the retreat game we have designed three possible solution based
on the different position of high value targets.
• When two targets are significantly far from each other.
• When two targets are nearer and formed a combined solution.
• A complicated solution.
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Case 1
In this game, the targets are farther from each other, so there won’t be any intersection
between the trajectories of attacker while engaging any of the high value targets. And they
behave as an independent high value targets.The solution to this game is provided in just
like the one, illustrated by the author Dr. Fuchs [5], in his earlier paper. Here, this game
gives us the brief idea about the overall game solution, when two high value targets are
significantly farther from each other with no intersection in between.The solution to this
game is described below with the respective plots.
In this following plot, the retreat surface is illustrated as red dashed line at y=-7,
and the capture is depicted as
√
(xA − xTi)2 + (yA − yTi)2 − 1 = 0. Figure 4.9 is the
complete solution for both the Game of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat.
Figure 4.10 shows the game for just the engagement section, Figure 4.11 represents the
game for Optimal Control Retreat. Figure 4.12 shows the jump trajectories that took place
throughout the game.Figure 4.13 represents the single game from time to to tf . The red
dashed line in this figure represents the escort region which the defender uses to escort
the attacker to retreat surface.The solid black line that terminates the surface just before
the constrained trajectory marked with red dashed line indicates the tangency coordinates
(x2, y2) and (−x2, y2). Figure 4.14 gives the plot for unconstrained region for this game.
Figure 4.15-4.18 represents the plot for constraint (µ), optimal control, value function and
adjoint variables simultaneously.
The value function plot Figure 4.17 help us know about the overall game. Looking at
the plot, we can figure it out, that for any initial condition where the attacker lies within the
optimal constrained region, it is always better for it to retreat rather than engage and which
is the objective of this thesis too.This value function plot Figure 4.17 corresponds to the
game shown in Figure 4.13, where attacker starts from any one initial position.
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Figure 4.9: Complete Solution
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Figure 4.10: Game of Engagement.
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Figure 4.11: Retreat Trajectories
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
x
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
y
Figure 4.12: Jump Trajectories
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Figure 4.13: Solution with one trajectory
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Figure 4.14: Unconstrained Trajectory
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Figure 4.16: Optimal Control Plot
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Figure 4.17: Value Function Plot
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Figure 4.18: Adjoint Variables Plot
Case 2:
In this section, we have illustrated the solution for the game where the two high value
targets are nearer to each other and they form intersection around the edges.
Figure 4.19 is the complete solution to our game at this circumstances.It comprise of
both the trajectory for game of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat. The red lines
indicates the trajectories when the attacker involves in the Engagement phenomenon. The
black lines are the trajectories for unconstrained retreat game.The blue line just across the
engagement trajectory is the region of constrained retreat. From this point the high value
targets attempts to escort the attacker until it hits the tangency point and, from that point the
attacker makes its way safely to the retreat zone.The blue dotted line represents the disper-
sal surface for the attacker.This is the state at which the attacker gains equal value function
for engaging either of the high value targets.The wider black line below the engagement
surface represents the surface where the value function for engaging is equal to the value
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function for retreat and it forms the upper bound for the unconstrained trajectories below
it.Similarly, the line dissipating from the constrained region are the jump trajectories as a
certain discontinuity occurs in the game due to the movement of attacker from one region
to other.They all terminates in a plane where retreating to either side presents equal value
function.
Figure 4.20 represents the game of engagement. Figure 4.21 shows the complete
game for constrained retreat. Figure 4.22 shows the trajectories after a discontinuity from
the constrained region to unconstrained one.And these are the jump trajectories from the
constrained regions. The adjoint variables λd and λα are dependent on the constraint value
µ so,it states a jump from the constrained region to unconstrained region. Here, we can see
the actual operation of the game. Figure 4.24 depicts the unconstrained region through-
out the game. Figure 4.25-4.28 are the figures representing the plot for value function,
constraint, optimal control and adjoint variables respectively.
Figure 4.23 gives the plot for the overall game with single trajectory.In this figure, the
constrained trajectory marked with red dash line represents the escort region. In this region,
the corresponding high value targets cooperates with the attacker to maximize its utility
function if attacker march into retreat region. However, if the attacker tries to jump into
engagement, the defender switches its strategy to minimize the attacker’s utility function
which provides a worst utility value for attacker. So, the defender successfully escort the
attacker in the constrained region till it hits the tangency point and after that the attacker
itself can get into retreat boundary as it will achieve high value function on retreating from
this position compare to engagement.
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Figure 4.19: Complete Solution
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Figure 4.20: Game of Engagement.
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Figure 4.21: Retreat Trajectories
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Figure 4.22: Jump Trajectories
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Figure 4.23: Solution with One Trajectory
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Figure 4.24: Unconstrained Plot
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Figure 4.25: Value Function Plot
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Figure 4.26: Constraint Plot
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Figure 4.27: Optimal Control Plot
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Figure 4.28: Adjoint Variables Plot
Case 3:
In this circumstance, there will be the possibility of more than one constrained regions.
Basically, it all depend upon the positioning of the high value targets with reference to
that of attacker.Here, in this condition, the the two high value targets are in position such
that they are one above another.This part of game has a complex solution.Because of the
complex nature, the game was solved using the global coordinate system.
We have the following figures to describe this situations:
Here, Figure 4.29 is the representation for the overall game which includes both the
optimization problems i.e Game of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat.Here,
the red dash line depicts the trajectories for the Game of Engagement. The black dashed
line are the trajectories for the unconstrained regions. The slanted trajectories marked as
blue and black dashed line are the jump trajectories in this game.
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Figure 4.30 represents the global engagement solution of the game. It shows the re-
spective trajectories for each of the high value targets from different initial position of the
attacker.The blue dotted line represents the dispersal surface from where it has the equal
probability of engaging any of the high value targets. Figure 4.31 is the solution for the opti-
mal constrained retreat. Here, we can see how the attacker approaches the retreat boundary
from different initial conditions. Figure 4.32 represents the jump trajectories that were ob-
served on this case. Here, we can see two different types of jump trajectories, one is from
the constrained region of one target to that of other, while the other one represents the over-
all jump solution from a position where it has an equal value for retreating from either side
of the high value target at higher position.
Figure 4.34 shows the unconstrained trajectories for the overall optimal constrained
retreat game.Figure 4.35-4.38 depicts the plots of constraint value (µ), value function ,
adjoint trajectories and optimal control simultaneously. We can see the trajectories are not
continuous in Figure 4.35 and Figure 4.37 . These are due to the jump that took place while
moving from the unconstrained regions to constrained and vice versa. Figure 4.36 shows
the relation of values for engagement and retreat. As we can see, around the constrained
region, the value function for both of the optimization problems are equal while value
function of Engagement is always less than that of Retreat in all other initial position. So,
its always beneficial for attacker to retreat on every initial position other than constrained
region.
Figure 4.33 represents the overall game of retreat under one initial position of at-
tacker.It shows the different steps that were used in formulating the game. First, it starts at
any initial condition. Then, the optimal trajectories arrive at the the first constrained region
tangentially and move along the surface until it hits the first tangency point. After this, the
attacker again continues to move tangentially along the surface till it hits the final tangency
point. And from that position,the attacker eventually go to terminate the game in the retreat
surface.
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Figure 4.29: Complete Solution
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Figure 4.30: Game of Engagement.
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Figure 4.31: Retreat Trajectories
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Figure 4.32: Jump Trajectories
40
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
x
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
y
Figure 4.33: Single Solution
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Figure 4.34: Unconstrained Regions
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Figure 4.35: Constraint Plot
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Figure 4.36: Value Plot
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Figure 4.37: Adjoint Trajectories
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Figure 4.38: Control Plot
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we solved an engage or retreat Differential Game for a single attacker
and two high value targets in terms of two related optimization problems. The equilib-
rium solutions obtained so far shows that for some initial conditions, it is optimal for the
defensive team to cooperate with the attacker to make retreat an attractive option.But at
the same time, the defender should be aware of attacker’s intention as it might switch to
engagement under some optimal condition. So, in order to maintain this cooperation, we
have imposed a value function constraint on attacker’s utility. This produces regions of
constrained retreat depending upon the orientation of high value targets, which we refer to
as escort regions. These are the regions, where, the defender cooperates with the attacker
to escort them safely into retreat surface so that both the attacker and defender will have
a win-win situation. To be so, the attacker should also follow the escort trajectory and get
into the retreat surface.
Even though, we have demonstrated that the strategies presented above are in equilib-
rium state, the attacker’s strategy is in a weak equilibrium at the constraint region. Since, at
this region, the value function for either engaging or retreating are same, the attacker could
eventually switch back to engagement and receive the same utility as retreat. So, we are
looking forward to develop the modified defender strategy which could prevent the attacker
from engaging at constraint regions. As an extension to this work ,we can work to solve
the game with mobile defender where both the high value targets will be in motion.
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